The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
Fareed Zakaria

The Case Against the Democratic State: an Essay in Cultural Criticism
Gordon Graham

Democracy: the God that Failed
Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Peter Rossi

Democracy, in popular and much academic use, is one of those things that people cannot get enough of. Whether it is leftist deliberative democrats wanting to democratise all aspects of society, or rightist American neo-conservatives bent on democratising foreign countries, scarce a bad word is said about democracy. By daring to tackle the sacred cow that democracy has become, these three books are extremely timely.

All three base their arguments on thorough examinations of the historical difference between classical liberal constitutionalism and democracy. There is a deep tension between the procedural legitimacy of democracy (a decision rule such as majoritarianism) and the substantive legitimacy of liberalism (protection of natural rights).

Procedural legitimacy has often eroded substantive legitimacy - this is the tyranny of the majority that Mill inveighed against. Classical liberals have always had a healthy suspicion of democracy, fearing that it might amount to mob rule. Thus Kant could call democracy despotism and Hayek argue that arbitrary majoritarianism was no better than other methods of oppression. Although liberalism and democracy are assumed by many to be the same, democratic regimes have sometimes been illiberal, and undemocratic regimes have sometimes been liberal.

The most moderate is Zakaria who argues that while too much democracy is illiberal, liberalism cannot do without it completely. At home, in the US, he discusses the problems caused by the increasingly direct nature of Californian democracy, and national problems caused by the 'democratization of politics' (p. 166). Where once politicians to some extent judged the correct thing to do, reforms and continual opinion polls have resulted in reactive politicians who are led purely by public opinion.

Such a situation is in effect rule by special interests. Abroad, Zakaria provides an excellent discussion of the difficulties involved in trying to democratise poor countries, and of particular note is his strong criticism of illiberal Arab states. His 'solution' is to resurrect the role of elites or modern aristocracy in civil society. Without such leadership, the democratisation of civil society causes a race to the bottom - a preference for quantity over quality.

However, while his recommendation for less direct democracy is welcome, he does not go far enough and advocate judge-made law, as Hayek and Leoni did. In fact, Hayek described majoritarian legislative-law as lawless government. While not without its shortcomings, then, Illiberal Democracy is well written and researched, and is recommended.

Slightly less moderate is Graham, who agrees with much of Zakaria's argument that there can be too much democracy, but goes further and questions the legitimacy of the democratic state itself. In just 93 A5 pages, Graham provides a devastating critique. In six chapters, he touches on the main anti-state arguments. He questions the need for the state to solve commons problems, he employs Plato to question the non-meritocratic nature of democracy, he implies that liberals ought to be more open to liberal dictatorships that preserve freedom, and he suggests that a neutral state is impossible.

His most powerful argument concerns what he describes as the democratic myth that democracy empowers the people. If the political cake is only so big, expanding suffrage cannot in the end empower people because in modern democracies, the slice becomes so small as to be causally irrelevant. He contrasts political power (the proverbial cake) to public goods such as road lighting (p. 58). Public goods by definition confer benefits on any number of people, while in this respect political power is limited. However, the democratic myth hides this fact so that democracy is not believed to suffer from diminishing returns. When people see through the myth, and discover voting is causally irrelevant, apathy results.

In his solution, Graham retains voting, but only as an expressive activity (like supporting your football team), and argues for the separation of the legislative and executive in the form of republicanism, 'Above all for an end to sophistry and illusion' (p. 93). Although you are occasionally left wanting more, page for page, Graham punches well above his weight. This book ought to be read by every student of politics.

The most extreme of the triumvirate is Hoppe. His is a pure anarcho-capitalist case against all states, particularly democratic versions. Indeed, he argues for monarchy in preference to democracy. Using the tragedy of the commons framework, he contrasts public (democracy) to private (monarchy) government, and concludes, rightly, that public ownership of government will lead to ruin for all. Private ownership of a resource (individually or collectively) provides the optimal incentive to maximise the value of the resource, and Hoppe makes a good case for government being no different to other resources.

Public government, particularly democracy, carries a lot of propaganda and moralistic baggage, as Graham discusses in his democratic myth concept, yet if one concentrates on the economic facts, as Hoppe does, the case against public government is clear. If political office is temporary ownership, the incentive (rare selfless politicians aside) is to maximise current benefits at the expense of future costs because the latter fall on someone else.

A perfect example is the recent Cancun trade talks: politicians from the West could not reduce agricultural subsidies because they would almost certainly be out of a job. Instead, they preferred to maximise their resource (getting re-elected) at the expense of developing world farmers. Importantly, Hoppe provides the figures which show that government expenditure in democracies is over five times that in monarchies (pp. 54 - 56), backing up his commons analogy.

Hoppe's solution is a bottom-up revolution involving a prominent role for liberal-libertarian elites and for private insurance companies to replace the state. Again, this book is recommended, especially for its public v. private government and libertarian v. liberal/conservative comparisons, although it is does contain some objectionable claims, such as a belief in a natural order irreconcilable with, inter alia, divorce and alternative lifestyles (p. 190).

While all the authors provide a convincing case against too much democracy, and Graham and Hoppe against democracy itself, their alternatives are less well elaborated. None of the three provide a good answer to the following query: hypothetically, ought liberals prefer a liberal dictatorship to democracy? Or, put another way, if the government is perfectly just, what is the point of democracy?

Under such a government, a liberal constitution would protect natural rights, so it is not clear why people would need to vote. All issues that do not affect rights, education for example, could be decided in the marketplace or civil society. In a recent paper, Professor Randy E Barnett states the following: 'The assumption that "first come rights, then comes government" helps explain how lawmaking can be legitimate in the absence of consent'.

On this account, a government is legitimate if it protects rights, even in the absence of democracy. What then to make of Zakaria: 'Politics is healthy; it is how people assert their power in a democracy. You need political support for any policy...' (p. 253) and 'Overwhelmingly [democracy] has wonderful consequences' (p. 16). It is not clear why liberals should agree.

You might argue, as Zakaria does, that democracy is a means to get rid of inept or corrupt governments, yet in the last century, democracy has arguably caused not hindered the massive expansion of government, as detailed by Hoppe. Furthermore, Graham makes two important challenges (pp. 46 - 50). First, although an empirical issue, there is a distinct lack of causal proof that democracies are more stable. For every relatively liberal democracy such as Britain, there is a Singapore or a Hong Kong. Second, by accepting that democracy allows us to 'throw the rascals out' we are assuming that democracy works perfectly - that governments such as Mugabe's or Hitler's did not exist.

If that counterfactual is allowed, we should also be able to assume that a liberal dictatorship works perfectly, and we can therefore conclude that such as system cannot be worse than democracy.

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