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Why the French Don't Like Headscarves
John R Bowen

Clarissa Woodberry
posted 29 November 2006

In 2004 the French government introduced legislation banning headscarves and other 'conspicuous' religious symbols from state schools. The wearing of headscarves in schools by a minority of Muslim girls had become a symbol of Islam and of separation. The law was seen by many people in France as a potential solution to a wide range of problems - from the oppression of women to the integration of the Muslim community. The events that led to a situation in which wearing headscarves in schools became such an important issue is the main question John Bowen addresses in this thoughtful and refreshing book.

Instead of focusing exclusively on recent problems of integration in France, Bowen attempts to explain support for the legislation by looking deeply at French history. The uniqueness of the French experience is emphasised - the particular form of separation of religion and the state (laïcité) and the distinction between the public and private spheres. Bowen comes to the conclusion that, in passing legislation, the political elites were perpetuating a French tradition from the time of Rousseau; that 'political thinkers have long conceived of laws to teach the people moral lessons.'

It is impossible to study the path to the legislation by simply looking at the French political climate - international events played a major role in shaping public attitudes towards Islam. It is interesting to look at the first French 'headscarf affair' in 1989; as this arose at the time of the publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses. In 1989 three girls turned up at school wearing Islamic dress and refused to remove it. At a different time their appearance 'would likely have passed unnoticed' but the 'conjecture of domestic and foreign threats made scarf-wearing into a national affair'. The importance of the international climate is apparent throughout the book and this is especially so after 11 September 2001. The change in perceptions of Islam comes across most forcefully in the remarks of the French Muslim women Bowen questioned. For example, Bowen quotes a young French Muslim saying how she took a train to work (on 12 September 2001) 'and the looks I got from others reminded me it was the 12th, of what happened the day before.'

The symbolism and importance of the legislation is clear throughout - this is apparent from the huge amount of publicity and protests it generated. Bowen is writing from an outsider's position (he is American) and it means that he is relatively detached from the controversy. Bowen says that, when he is asked about his opinions on the legislation, he is 'gratified that people are still unsure what I think'. This is apparent throughout the book as the author mostly refrains from making judgements. The book is a narrative history, placing the headscarf ban in context, rather than a polemic about the rights and wrongs of French policy.

The bulk of Why the French Don't Like Headscarves is devoted to the gradual increase of public and elite interest in issues of integration. It is interesting to see how the idea of a ban on headscarves in schools slowly moved up the agenda over a 15 year period. Events in France throughout the 1990s, such as increased segregation and support for the far right (most notably in the 2002 presidential election) made the issue more prominent and, from the politicians point of view, more urgent that they be seen to 'do something' about Islam.

The most obvious reason why headscarves in particular became such an issue was because they were closely linked with 'three problems in French society: communalism, Islamism and sexism' all of which people had become 'deeply worried about'. However much media and political attention was given to the problems of 'scarves in schools' the underlying problem of the lack integration remained. Bowen addresses this - the disproportionate amount of attention given to the headscarves debate at the expense of more serious problems such as the levels of unemployment amongst young Muslims. The riots in 2005 were a stark reminder of how little progress has been made towards further integration and as the author says the riots were a reflection of 'how deeply ran the resentments and anger created in the poor suburbs by these policy failures'.

The importance of identity is paramount throughout the debate. The headscarves issue was so highly charged because it became a clear symbol of identity. Worries about a new generation of French-born girls voluntarily wearing a symbol of a foreign culture struck a cord with people because of the extent of segregation in French society. Bowen emphasises the relative novelty of girls wearing headscarves not because of parental pressure but as 'part of a conscious effort to create a new identity… defining themselves in Islamic terms'. The movement that started in the 1980s - from an identity as immigrants to an Islamic one - is a crucial trend underlying the debate. Readers are left to draw their own conclusion about the outcomes of the legislation - as it was introduced two years ago it is far too early to judge its effects on community integration. Even though the book focuses on France, issues about identity, religion in schools and the best way of achieving integration and highly relevant to many Western societies. Why the French Don't Like Headscarves is a timely publication that should increase understanding of such controversial subjects.

 

 
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