Database State (PDF), a report commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, is a call to action. Like many citizens, the authors are pretty livid about the government’s failure to get its house in order regarding its role as custodian of people’s personal data. The report suggests that problem is not just about the physical security of how information is stored – and lost. Their concern is with a more systemic problem with the massive growth in the last 10 years of databases containing personal data.

They flag up a range of contributing factors to this development. These include the current interpretation of data protection law; the promiscuous sharing of data; the number of people given access to systems; a lack of expertise in system design; and problems relating to procurement. Importantly, the report attempts to show there is a direct link between the view we take of privacy and how systems are managed.

A privacy test

To start with, the report provides a definition of privacy.

‘Throughout this report, we have used the word ‘privacy’ to refer to people’s right not to have sensitive information about them shared without their consent or an overriding legal reason. Privacy is actually shorthand for a complex bundle of issues, ranging from dignity to discrimination, and rooted in our need to control what we tell others about ourselves.’

For the authors, three considerations seem most important in the defence of privacy. The first is the legal basis for any privacy intrusions and whether these are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society; their main yardstick is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Second, they believe an individual’s control of their personal data is sacrosanct – unless a law overrides the case for anonymity. Personal data and information should only be shared with the express wishes of the individual concerned. Third, they say that experience shows,

‘…that a system can have security, or functionality, or scale, and with good design it may even have any two of these; but it is not feasible to achieve all three.’

It follows for the authors that systems that deal with personal information must be either simple or local, and shared only with the subject’s consent or for a specific lawful purpose. They examine 46 databases, mainly from within central government departments, but also encompassing local government and European systems. Only six of the databases pass the test they have developed – and are labelled Green in the report’s ‘traffic light’ system – and the reasons given appear fairly straightforward and there seems little reason to disagree with their assessment.

The ones in the failing, Red category relate to some current flagship central government projects, and their assessment is likely to be far more controversial. Databases include ContactPoint (the database identifying all agency contact with children), the NHS Detailed Care Record, the General Matching Service (linked to fraud investigation), the Interception Modernisation Programme (tracking every individual’s communications), the National DNA Database, and the National ID register. Concerns are legion but questions focus on the amount of information stored and who will have access to it. The vast majority of databases, about 27, are assessed as Amber and it is recommended that all these databases should be subjected to independent review.

How did the database state come about?

The authors provide their view on the key reasons for the emergence of the database state.

- Too much outsourcing of IT in the 1980s means many departments now do not have people with the skills to manage complex procurements;
- The Blair government’s second-term decision to invest heavily in IT following the dotcom crash - to placate IT industry lobbyists and also be a substitute for structural public-service reform;
- A ‘Transformational Government’ programme was supposed to make public services better or cheaper, but it has been repeatedly challenged by controversies over effectiveness, privacy, legality and cost. Also, technology simply makes it easy to gather large volumes of data;
- Related to this programme but also connected to wider policy initiatives where gathering data is often a bi-product of the latest policy initiative that may or may not continue;
- Projects lack clarity of purpose;
- UK implementation of data protection law can appear less of an impediment to data sharing than elsewhere in Europe

Importantly, the report also suggests that during this time, two different faces of government were being joined up which the database state appears to fuse these two together. One is the public services agenda, which formalises our social compassion. It speaks of customers and choice, cares for vulnerable children, provides health and education, keeps the streets clean and generally seeks to please. The other is the enforcing state, in constant conflict with those who break laws or ignore regulations. It seeks to exercise coercive control and speaks of enemies, targets, suspects and criminals.

A key assertion therefore within the report is that, when the various events listed above are considered along side a changing policy context, a very new state of affairs has developed where,

‘All aspects of our lives will be surrounded by masses of data collected without our consent, and shared well beyond the purposes for which they were originally collected.’

It is interesting that the authors write this in the future tense, suggesting the database state as something we’re still moving into, rather than a state of affairs already existing.

Privacy – are we there yet?

The author’s don’t believe the fate of individuals’ privacy can be left to chance. Alongside their proposals for review of databases, the make a number of recommendations considered essential for basic protection of privacy and for effective information governance. They also caution against the false hope to be had in the idea that government incompetence will ensure many of the gigantic systems will never work - although this is a view shared by many, including people from within government. The analysis provided doesn’t fully explain the novelty of our contemporary culture, however, and some further development of points is required.

In an essay I wrote in 2007, before the wave of data breaches, and as part of an ongoing discussion within local government around this topic, I suggested some other features of contemporary social policy that affect privacy. My point was that the undermining of privacy is happening in the real, non-digital, off-line world. Privacy intrusions don’t just happen when information is inappropriately gathered, stored or shared. Intervention in people’s private lives and private thoughts now occurs so routinely that it has become a normal fact of life. Your children are weighed as part of an obesity initiative; hectoring ‘advice’ is given to you around parenting, health and diet; we are recipients of continual prompts around our social activities and our conduct on anything from smoking to sex.

The justification for this is not as part of simple service provision, and often not connected to the enforcing state. Rather a whole area of public policy has developed around victimhood and protecting the vulnerable – the therapeutic state. Maintaining a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence is much harder for individuals today. This goes some way to explain why civil liberties arguments can feel very out of kilter with mainstream consensus and lived experience, and appear very legalistic.

The other new trend in public policy which is touched on by the authors, but needs further development is the increasing tendency to ‘tag’ us. This has both digital and real world dimensions, and there are some complex developments in train that need some unpicking. On the one hand there is a new tendency for policy makers to try to make predictions of behaviour – be it as a way of preventing antisocial behaviour or marketing a service. The upshot of this is that we are increasingly badged as ‘types’ under a general banners of prevention or efficiency. Arguably, this diminishes the importance of our autonomy, and scope for experimentation and reinvention. ‘Prevention’ is a buzz word that links many such initiatives. Such tagging also tends to stimulate the trend towards the centralisation of data, as associations between different datasets are made.

A different development is the personalisation of services and potential innovations that could happen through improved sharing of data.  For example, through improved sharing of data between services and organisation, it may be possible to help identify additional services someonce could access to aid them live indepently at home for longer. New forms of marketing could then alert people to further help – just like Amazon let’s us know about other products we might be interested in.

Much of this is unlikely given the current hypersensitivity around sharing of personal data. It strikes me that much of the personal information gathered by government is not actually very interesting and doesn’t say a great deal about the people we actually are. However, as there are few aspects of life that people feel really in control of, personal data takes on heightened level of importance. Ironically, as indicated above, real state intervention in day to day life occurs without comment, or is welcomed.

Viewed in this way, the database state is only a manifestation of a loss of autonomy and independence amongst the public at large. Whilst the authors have attempted to provide some very clear recommendations as a guide to action, it is going to be a harder job to address the degree of routine intrusion in our personal lives.

Conclusion

The authors of Database State want to see a civilised state, and it becomes clear that the report is written for a government and policy making audience, rather than the general public.

‘Government should compel the provision or sharing of sensitive personal data only for strictly defined purpose, and in almost all cases, sensitive data should be kept on local rather than national systems.’

Also, in a statement about those databases they assigned green status, the authors say:

‘Its privacy intrusions (if any) have a proper legal basis and are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.’

The authors seem to conclude that prevention of any further extension of the database state will be through an appeal to the state to do the right thing. A number of legally prescribed checks and balances need to be in place – just in case and to provide an independent view on what data can be held.

The report leaves many questions unanswered. What does independent mean, and who is qualified to provide the definitive view on what data can and can’t be held? If policy initiatives around public service and the enforcing state have become fused together, what needs to happen in public debate to ensure these are separated again? The status given to the ECHR and independent panels seem to ensure these bodies will feature in discussions around privacy – but only in fairly narrow and legalistic terms. What role does the general public have in determining the status assigned to privacy. This is a political rather than a legal issue and will be negotiated on the basis of how much people value their autonomy and independence.

Despite the authoritative tone of the report, it doesn’t capture the full extent to which people’s private lives have been undermined subtle but significant ways. 
Protecting pieces of digital information is one thing and may be where the efforts of civil libertarians will be made. But we shouldn’t mistake the discussion privacy of information as being the same as a defence of personal freedom. With freedom must come our ability to act independently and autonomously; the theraputic state constantly limits our ability to do this. It is currenlty hard to conceive how we should design modern society that utilises to the full the benefits technology can bring when the climate is one where personal autonomy is so little valued.