‘The robust Muscular Christian haranguing us from the pulpit of my old school chapel admitted a sneaking regard for atheists…What this preacher couldn’t stand was agnostics: namby-pamby, mushy pap, weak tea, weedy, pallid fence sitters.’ Richard Dawkins (2006, p46).

Agnosticism has fallen again into disfavour in recent days – especially among unbelievers. The thesis is often dismissed as an ‘easy out’ for the wishy-washy, weak-kneed, mush head – or the default position of the merely intellectually slothful sort who simply refuses to think through difficult issues. The agnostic, claim opponents among both believers and their antagonists, simply refuses to embrace the clear implications of the available evidence. It is, they say (or imply), the coward’s thesis. It is essentially a mere shrug in the face of controversy. This insistence that we do not (or cannot) know about the existence of God, offered in place of careful critical evaluation is a sham humility masking unprincipled reticence to truly engage in a contentious and sometimes heated debate. Thus, many in the opposing camps regard agnosticism with contempt, disdain, and derision. Agnostics are, in short, wimps.

More than not knowing

Stunningly, however, those who so deride agnosticism often, in the very next breath, go on to articulate the agnostic’s thesis as an obvious truth. They say (with a hint of disgust), ‘Of course, no one knows for certain whether or not there is some kind of god or supernatural phenomenon,’ as if this somehow undermines agnosticism’s credibility as a viable or interesting thesis. In his recent book, The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins dismisses agnosticism’s foundational claim as a triviality:

That you cannot prove God’s non-existence is accepted and trivial, if only in the sense that we can never absolutely prove the non-existence of anything. (2006, p54)

How is it, I cannot help but wonder, that a thesis is discredited or deemed trivial simply because it is clearly true? Is the law of non-contradiction similarly trivial and useless? The agnostic, though, has something more to contribute to the debate concerning the existence of the supernatural than merely pointing out that we cannot (or do not) know with absolute certainty about the existence of God or gods. This all-too-common mischaracterisation of agnosticism is, I shall argue, unfair on several fronts. First, there is nothing inherently counterfeit, intellectually squeamish, or wimpy about the position that we do not know whether some God (or other non-natural entity or force) exists. It is simply an honest recognition of our limitations and/or the intrinsically recondite nature of the subject at hand. Second, the typical agnostic does not merely make a claim about what is or is not known with certainty, but argues that we lack sufficient evidence for even embracing belief or disbelief regarding particular propositions. Agnosticism is not wimpy; it is intellectually circumspect and humble – in an arena that calls for a degree of humility. Being only somewhat more intelligent than the other primates, humans ought to embrace the possibility that the foundation of all being could, conceivably, fall beyond our ken. The agnostic simply accepts the possibility that there are some things that we do not know, that we may never know, regarding which we may lack sufficient justification for the formation of any belief at all, and that the nature of ultimately reality could be one such area of inquiry.

Finally, agnosticism is best understood not so much a thesis one must defend, but rather as a stance issuing a challenge to those brandishing theses regarding the existence or non-existence of God (or the supernatural). The agnostic does not believe that compelling evidence of (any) God’s existence has been offered, and does not believe that compelling evidence has been offered demonstrating that no God, creator, designer, or phenomenon transcending the natural realm exists. The agnostic simply sees insufficient justification for adopting a belief in either direction (so to speak), and insists that anyone claiming such justification bears the burden of proof – a burden that has not yet been met to the agnostic’s satisfaction. Agnosticism is, I contend, the proper default position regarding God’s existence (or the existence of the trans-natural, or non-natural), and judgment about such matters should be withheld unless and until compelling evidence is proffered demonstrating that there either is or is not some type of supernatural phenomenon. It is also worth noting that the locution ‘some type’ is crucial to this dispute. In The Faith of a Heretic, Walter Kaufmann notes that:

The practice of seizing on a label instead of considering a man’s ideas is common, if often unconscious. The labels, theist, atheist, and agnostic, provide an especially important example. One supposes that the theist believes God exists, while the atheist denies that God exists, and the agnostic, in the absence of sufficient evidence, suspends judgment. It is further supposed that theists agree about the facts of the matter. One rarely stops to think about what these facts are supposed to be, except, of course, to say that theists think that God exists. But what does this assertion mean? (1961, p28)

One must be clear concerning what proposition it is about which one suspends one’s judgment. It is important to recognise that there are, and have been, bewilderingly many forms of religious belief. Some of these are undoubtedly worthy of outright rejection and disbelief. Atheism about Thor is, for example, probably quite reasonable. We must, however, be careful about lumping all beliefs concerning the nature of ultimate reality together, and declaring all but the strictly naturalistic equally preposterous. While many conceptions of God or ‘the divine’ may richly deserve the brand of ridicule and disparagement that we find in recent (and admirable) works such as Sam Harris’ The End of Faith, Christopher Hitchens’ God is Not Great, and Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion, it does not follow that every thesis proposing something (or some non-thing) other than matter, energy, and natural law ought to be so readily cast aside as the benighted superstition of a pre-scientific age. Though there are a number of theses concerning the nature of God or some transcendence of the natural realm that have not, in my judgment, been demonstrated to be indefensible or absurd, in the interest of parsimony, I will focus on only one hypothesis about which, I shall argue, the proper attitude is the agnostic’s suspension of judgment. Let us consider whether there is sufficient evidence for or against deism.

Deism: the god who does not care

The meaning of ‘deism’ that I have in mind here is nicely articulated in Anthony Flew’s, A Dictionary of Philosophy. Flew makes the etymological point that the term ‘deism’:

…has appeared in various forms in various periods of history, but its best known manifestations are found in the thought of the 18th-century Enlightenment and, especially, of Voltaire. It is usually taken to involve God’s leaving the Universe to its own lawful devices, without any particular interventions, once the process of creation had been completed. (1979, p87)

It is precisely this non-interventionist aspect of the deistic God (or god – lower case ‘g’) that makes for the difficulty of demonstrating the existence or non-existence of such a being (or force). Much the same case could be made (though for different reasons) in favor the agnostic’s stance regarding the Tao or Brahman as these are presented within certain Asian wisdom traditions and, perhaps, even some permutations of Stoic conceptions of the all-pervading Logos. Let us, however, stick with Voltaire’s deism and see if conclusive evidence, or anything like it, can be produced in its favour or against it.

The deist might claim that there is nothing unreasonable about the thesis that God ‘touched off’ the Big Bang (‘Let there be light!’) and, thereafter, ceased to interact with the universe in any way. Perhaps He, She, or It no longer even notes the passing of events and disinterestedly allows nature to ‘take its course’ whatever that course may be (and whatever consequences might be in store for us). Let us stipulate that no cosmological argument succeeds in proving that such a creator exists (or ever did). Failure to prove the existence of the deistic god does not, however, constitute a proof of that god’s non-existence. It is, as Dawkins suggests, impossible to prove that such a laissez-faire god does not exist (and never did)? This being so, what is the complaint about agnosticism relative to the deistic God? Though questions remain about how such a God (and Its creation) could have come into being, these questions tend to afflict all theories of ultimate origin. Naturalistic accounts of the Big Bang and its causal antecedents also founder (as yet) on the question of cosmological origin.

Generally speaking, the sceptic claims that we do not know a particular proposition or, in many cases, that we are unable even to provide rational justification for any belief regarding the proposition in question. The sceptic’s strategy is to demand proof, evidence, argument, or some sort of attempted justification for the interlocutor’s hypothesis. The sceptic may then subject the claim in question to rigorous critical evaluation. If the proffered evidence is found wanting, and does not withstand the rigors of sceptical analysis, then the sceptic need not accept the proposition or claim at issue. In such cases, the sceptic simply remains sceptical. To remain sceptical is not necessarily to reject the assertion as false, but simply to insist that it remains unproven (by, at least, the sceptic’s lights). The theist, or other believer (there are, after all, non-theistic versions of ‘the divine’ or ultimate reality) must prove that God exists - or probably exists. Failing that, it is irresponsible to believe in God. On the other hand, the atheist must demonstrate that we have good reason to believe that no God, no supernatural or transcendent something-or-other exists – or that it is probable that no such thing exists. Failing that, it is irresponsible to embrace atheism.

It is my contention that agnosticism, properly understood, and not atheism, represents the sceptical attitude, and also the most rationally justified position with respect to the question of the existence of God (or gods) as the ultimate creator(s) and/or designer(s) of our universe. Though certain particular conceptions of God may, I think, be safely relegated to the dustbin of religion’s often rationally indefensible history, and various particular propositions regarding God’s alleged interventions in the (otherwise) natural world (eg. virgin births, resurrections of the dead, or punitive planetary deluge) may be, indeed should be, regarded as almost certainly false (and even embarrassing abjurations of rationality), it does not follow that the possibility of the existence of any transcendent grounding of reality has been demonstrated to be irrational.

I do not defend agnosticism regarding anthropomorphisms such as those derived from, for example, a naïve, literalist reading of the Old Testament or the Koran – any more than I would defend agnosticism regarding Thor, Poseidon, Athena, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster. All accounts of such beings are worthy of atheism (ie. outright rejection) on the grounds that the alleged activities of these beings would constitute contraventions of the established laws of nature. Similarly, any interventionist God (eg. the type to which one prays) should be regarded as unlikely (to say the least) because the alleged interventions cannot be squared with our most well confirmed scientific theories. This, however, leaves open the possibility of a non-interventionist, or disinterested God (or gods). To put the matter more succinctly, neither the proposition that (some) God exists, nor the proposition that no God (of any type) exists, has been conclusively established. Shorter still – the deistic god’s existence is not obviously more or less probable than that god’s non-existence. If this contention is correct, then the agnostic’s ‘shrug’ concerning the matter is the only rationally defensible position. Should one believe that God exists? No. Should one believe that God does not exist? No. What other option is there? One humbly admits that current evidence is insufficient to support either belief – and one leaves it at that.

The arguments that need not appear here

Having encountered disturbingly many permutations of cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments, as well as a dizzying variety of claims to religious or mystical experience (allegedly unexplainable naturalistically) and, having further encountered far more objections to the aforementioned than really ought to have been necessary, it seems to me that the opposition has generally gotten the better of the debate. I will mercifully spare the reader yet another iteration of the interminable explanation of these arguments, objections, replies, counter-replies, etc. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that all hitherto advanced arguments for God’s existence are flawed. Those unwilling to make this assumption, even just for the sake of argument, may find a diminishing marginal utility hereafter. Should I, therefore, adopt the atheist’s position and conclude that God does not exist? When we add the problem of evil (the scale, scope, intensity, and ubiquity of human suffering) into the mix – another debate into which I will mercifully refrain from wading in this paper – do I not then find that atheistic disbelief remains as the only tenable and, therefore, most rationally justifiable position on the board? Though it may be somewhat unfashionable at the moment to say so, I think not. Merely refuting all available arguments in favor of the existence of a creator and/or designer God(s), and pointing out an apparent problem for one theory of God’s nature (namely theism), does not yet amount to a proof of the non-existence (or even the probable non-existence) of a creator and/or designer being (or force, or ‘transcendent principle,’ or whatever) underwriting this universe and our presence within it. Unless it can be demonstrated that matter, energy, and the laws of nature are the only plausible antecedents of our presence in this universe, then atheists still, it seems to me, have some work to do.

There are features of the natural world (like the fact that it is here at all, and that it happens to be hospitable to intelligent life), and elements of the human condition that may give (and have given) pause to even cautious, rational observers. Perhaps purely naturalistic explanations of all such phenomena can, and ultimately will be given. Perhaps God will prove to be a superfluous posit of a scientifically benighted age. Even so, this would not prove that God (or whatever) does not exist, but would, at most, establish that we, in the words of Pierre Laplace, simply ‘have no need of that hypothesis’. We should not expect this state of affairs to manifest any time soon. The cause (if there was one) of the Big Bang and/or the origin of life might remain forever beyond our reach.

Anticipating atheist conniptions

Many atheists will, at this point barely able to contain their derision, impatiently draw analogies to agnosticism about Santa Claus, or about Bertrand Russell’s celestial teapot orbiting the sun, unobservable from our vantage point. Such analogies are, however, weak (and, I think, a little disingenuous). Santa and the teapot are much more implausible than the disinterested ‘first cause’ of deism. I am not a scientist, but I am fairly confident that Santa’s exploits would constitute violations of a variety of well-established laws of nature. He seems to cover a lot of territory in one night, manages to fit down chimneys that are narrower than himself (not to mention the loot he carries with him), and he is alleged to mush a team of flying reindeer! I will leave it to physicists, engineers, and evolutionary biologists to explain the degree of implausibility inherent in the Santa story. As for Russell’s teapot, disbelief is appropriate here as well. There are good reasons to conclude that its occurrence as a natural phenomenon is unlikely in the extreme. There are good reasons to disbelieve in both Santa and the teapot. It would be irrational to be ‘agnostic’ about them.

Do we, however, face an analogous proposition in the case of the deistic god? This creator is allegedly responsible for the existence of matter, energy, and the laws of nature that govern them – at least in this universe. It would seem then, that the initial act of creation could not, by the deist’s lights, have been subject to, or constrained by, the laws of nature (they weren’t ‘there’ yet). Well, it is the laws of nature and the behaviour of matter and energy in accordance with those laws that make Santa and Russell’s teapot impossible (or, at least, wildly implausible). What then makes it irrational to refrain from disbelief in the deistic god? Why is it irrational, when confronted with deism, to simply shrug and admit that it is possible? Why should it be regarded as obvious that a purely naturalistic explanation is more plausible? An agnostic may legitimately claim to have no justification for embracing the one view as opposed to the other – and may, therefore, refrain from embracing either.

Conclusion

The agnostic demands proof of theses proffered by others brandishing them in the marketplace of ideas. There is a God, you say? Prove it. Provide evidence that your thesis is superior to naturalistic alternatives. There is no God, you say? Prove it. Prove that naturalistic explanations are rationally preferable to all available alternatives. Provide evidence that compels the rational person to disbelieve in all putatively transcendent phenomena. If neither of the competitor theses can meet this challenge (and agnostics are agnostics because neither has met this challenge to their satisfaction), then the only remaining defensible position is a ‘shrug,’ and the humble admission that we do not know and, in fact, that we do not even have compelling reason to support either belief or disbelief regarding the competing theses. Sometimes, it must be noted, a shrug really is the best that anyone can do.

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Works cited

Dawkins, Richard (2006). The God Delusion. Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, New York.
Flew, Antony (1979). A Dictionary of Philosophy: Revised Second Edition. St. Martin’s Press: New York.
Harris, Sam (2005). The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, London.
Hitchens, Christopher (2007). God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything. Twelve, Hachette Book Group USA: New York.
Jacoby, Susan. (2004). Freethinkers: A History of American Secularism. Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC: New York.
Kaufmann, Walter (1961). The Faith of a Heretic. Doubleday & Company: Inc. Garden City, New York.