‘The Rise of China Spells the Decline of the West’
Intelligence Squared Debate, London, 1 November 2005Another IQ2 debate and another packed house, for a debate on a topic that we can safely say is of genuinely world-historic significance: the rise and rise of China. As per usual, there was a diverse and exciting array of speakers assembled. Arguing for the motion, there were the journalists Jonathan Fenby, formerly of The South China Morning Post, Guardian columnist Isabel Hilton and Financial Times stalwart Martin Wolf. Arguing against, was the noted Canadian writer on globalisation John Ralston Saul, the writer on Chinese business Joe Studwell and LSE economist Linda Yueh.
In the event, the audience voted overwhelmingly (401 to 263) against the motion, even though the stronger arguments were presented by the declinists. Throughout the evening, the debate never crystallised along any distinct lines, though this reflected the diversity of the arguments presented. Indeed, one of the strengths of the debate was that virtually every major school of thought about China’s rise was present: the West’s decline is real, but it will be relative, not absolute; China isn’t really rising at all, due to its dependent model of development and failure to develop its own branded companies; China’s rise represents a return to history as normal, with an arrogant, imperial Middle Kingdom lording it over the barbarians outside; China’s industrialisation portends ecological disaster; the Chinese scramble for armaments foreshadows aggressive expansionism; China’s Confucian culture entails that there will be no conflict with the West, because Chinese people don’t think in the binary, Manichean terms of Western philosophy…
One theme that did recur however was an inchoate vulgar Marxism - Martin Wolf was the clearest exponent of this approach, as he consistently attributed China’s rise to the ‘tyranny of numbers’ - that is to say, China’s rise was given in its output statistics. And, indeed, the statistics are difficult to avoid with China, given just how impressive they are. Martin Wolf pointed out that the Chinese economy has grown seven to eight fold since 1978 - and that this was achieved with only a sixth of its potential labour force. Others, such as Fenby, made much of speculations on the actual size of China’s military budget. The two speakers who focused more on the non-material aspects of China’s, rise were less than convincing, however. John Ralston Saul rambled about how Confucianism was more morally sophisticated, meaning that Chinese people were incapable of thinking in clear terms, somehow translating in to an argument that there need not be conflict with the West. Isabel Hilton on the other hand, argued that Chinese ‘soft power’ - Beijing’s diplomatic ties with various unsavoury regimes (Zimbabwe, Sudan and Burma), and its growing cultural influence - meant that it was rapidly catching up on US global dominance. But this, too, was unconvincing: a few impoverished Third World countries and Jackie Chan movies do not amount to an unbeatable alliance for world domination.
In short, the speakers paid insufficient attention to the politics of China’s rise. Since China’s take-off, the Chinese elite has effectively substituted economic growth for politics. China may be able to export its way to prosperity, but whether it will forge the political movements and ideas of the future is still an open question, and one worth considering in debates such as these. Contrary to the trite prejudices being peddled by some of the speakers on the panel (that the Chinese are culturally insular and supercilious), the Chinese elite has proved remarkably receptive to importing ‘governance’ ideas from the European Union - ideas about fighting pollution, writing better laws to regulate both domestic and international affairs, and so on. However potentially powerful the Chinese economy, it seems that Western bureaucrats still have the final word on the best models of social and political organisation for the world. In other words, ideas matter, and they will play a crucial role in determining the impact and reach of China’s newfound economic power in the twenty first century. And on this front, China has yet to deliver the goods.
It was perhaps the chair for the evening, former BBC presenter Anna Ford, who stole the show, cutting a swathe through the meandering avenues of the various arguments. After the votes had been counted, she closed the evening by quoting a recent speech by the director general of the Confederation of British Industry, Digby Jones: ‘When China and India look at Britain - where we have examinations you cannot fail, sports days with no winners and schools where conkers and backstroke are banned on health grounds - they must think it is their birthday every day’.
Philip Cunliffe is co-convenor of the Sovereignty And Its Discontents working group.

