American foreign policy has taken a very wrong turn in the last decade and a half, argue Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman in Ethical Realism, a Vision for America’s Role in the World. Their book is a powerful critique of the contemporary policy and a recommendation for future action. The current administration, the authors argue, has led the US into one disastrous policy after another; it has overspent vastly, launched an immoral and catastrophic invasion of Iraq, and contributed significantly to global instability by threatening Russia and Iran and putting pressure on China. US foreign policy is dangerous for the unlucky people – such as Iraqis – at its receiving end, but also for Americans and the rest of us, since it has served to increase conflict and instability world wide and damaged global prosperity and growth.

Current US foreign policy, the authors argue compellingly, is basically irrational, counterproductive and destabilising. Pertinent points are made about its underlying assumptions, for example the folly of using hard pressure to make states democratise and the greater mistake in trying to ‘spread democracy’ through military assault and occupation. As Lieven and Hulsman point out, most people, whatever they think of their government, do not take kindly to being invaded and occupied.

The current administration has made the world a more dangerous place, and its policies have further worked directly against American interests. Why, puzzle the authors, in a post-Cold War situation where no states can or indeed wish to challenge the US in the way that the Soviet Union did, has America worked so hard to create new enemies? Rather than enjoying the unparalleled opportunity for global peace and prosperity that would mainly benefit America, the government has actively sought, for example, to alienate and threaten China and Russia. Yet as they point out, both Russia and China are status quo powers. Furthermore, the administration has ignored the need for international legitimacy and consensus, whose absence means major problems for the US lie ahead.

However, one of the book’s strengths is that it doesn’t simply blame Bush. Whilst much of the critique focuses on the incumbent administration, it points out that both Democrats and Republicans share the same misguided point of view and underlying philosophy when it comes to foreign policy. Whilst Europeans and American liberals are convinced Obama will take a more multilateral and non-interventionist approach, the authors are not so sanguine: there is little difference between Republican neoconservatives and Democrat liberal hawks who will be influential in any Democrat administration. Certainly there seems to be little difference in foreign policy statements from Obama and McCain. Whilst McCain may be more belligerent towards Iran, Obama has stressed he would be prepared to take action against Pakistan. Both have emphasised the need for pre-emptive action, whilst Obama has appointed Joe Biden, a renowned liberal hawk, as his running mate for vice president.

The book argues both Democrats and Republicans have lost touch with reality when it comes to foreign policy. Rather than engaging with the world as it is, both parties prefer to indulge in dangerous fantasies about America’s role and capacity to act upon other states to transform them into model democracies. And on both sides, there is a preposterous conflation of current Arab regimes, Arab nationalism and al-Qaeda into an imaginary construction called ‘Islamic totalitarianism’. The problem is that Bush has remained stuck in a Cold War model of thinking; today, the challenges that face America require an entirely different approach and new policies. Whilst wasting its time and resources trying to push states such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran into becoming Soviet Union substitutes, the administration has neglected the most real and pressing global threat from al-Qaeda and global Islamic terrorism. Here, the authors argue that Russia, China and even Iran could be allies for America.

A prescriptive programme called ‘ethical realism’ is presented, which entails a realistic assessment of the international environment and the real threats to America, with policies based on prudent and ‘humble’ strategies, thus resolving the problem of international consensus and legitimacy. One suggestion is that the US promote regional concerts of power and assist Muslim states to develop gently and helpfully. EU accession should be a model for the transformation of non-democratic states rather than the Bush model.

To what extent the EU accession process offers a benign and positive method of state transformation is beyond the scope of this review. Also, the notion that al-Qaeda presents such a great threat does not stand up to scrutiny. However, even before engaging with the authors’ prescriptions, there is a more important limitation to their argument. Whilst the critique of current (and ongoing) policy and its implications is strong, the book is weaker in its analysis of why American policy seems stuck in its disastrous mould and why this is a cross-party problem.

That Bush is stuck in a Cold War model of thinking rings true, but the question is surely why, and why do the Democrats make the same mistake? Why is it that post-Cold War administrations have sought to re-create the certainties of the Cold War and are engaged in interventionist foreign policies. Without an understanding of the specific political situation in which America finds itself, the authors’ prescription for an ethically real US foreign policy is simply a wish list with no grounding in reality.